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one for the jury if reasonable minds could differ on whether 
or not the two productions are similar. 
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial 
court to overrule the demurrer as to all counts and permit de-
fendants to answer if they be so advised. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28, 
1953. Carter, J., and Spence, J ., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[h A. No. 22215. In Bank. Apr. 29, 1953.] 
THOMSON BURTIS, Respondent. v. UNIVERSAl! PIC-
'l'URES COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Ap-
pellants. 
[1] Literary Property-Evidence.-In action for unauthorized use 
of literary property, a judgment for plaintiff is not sustained 
by evidence that he first wrote an outline synopsis designed 
for development into a motion picture script, which was sub-
mitted to defendant motion picture company; that on the 
basis of this synopsis plaintiff and defendant entered into 
an agreement under which plaintiff was to complete an orig-
inal story suitable for a motion picture and defendant was 
granted an option to purchase the story for a designated sum; 
that the story, on its completion, was delivered to defendant, 
which did not exercise the option and which retained both 
the synopsis and the story; and that defendant some years 
later produced a picture based on the same basic theme, where 
a comparison of the story and the motion picture shows no 
similarity between them as to form and manner of expression. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Henry M. Willis, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action for damages for unauthorized use of literary prop-
erty. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Prop-
erty and Copyright, § 66 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Literary Property. 
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Loeb & Iweb, Herman F'. Selvin and Harry JJ. Gershon 
for Appellants. 
Fendler, Weber & Lerner, Harold A. Fendler, Robert W. 
Lerner and Jacques Leslie for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J .-Thomson Burtis, the author of an as-
sertedly plagiarized sereen play, was awarded damages for 
the unauthorized use of his literary property. The principal 
lluestion presented for decision upon the appeal from the 
judgment concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict of the jury. 
[1] In 1938, Burtis, an established professional writer, sub-
mitted an untitled story synopsis to Universal Pictures Com-
pany, Inc. 'l'he synopsis interested Universal to the extent 
that it entered into a written agreement with Burtis providing 
that, for $250, he would write an original story of not less 
than 10,000 words "suitable for a Danielle Darrieux photo-
play" to be tentatively entitled "Manhattan Masquerade." 
He gave Universal an option, to be exereised within two weeks 
following delivery of the story, to purchase it for $3,250. 
In the event Universal did not exercise the option, it was 
to obtain no right, title or interest in the story. 
Subsequently, Burtis wrote a story of about 20,000 words, 
which he delivered to Universal. The company did not exercise 
its option but retained both the untitled synopsis and the 
screen script in its files until this action was filed. A review 
of the synopsis, in mimeographed form, prepared by an em-
ployee of Universal, was available to all writers and producers 
on the lot. 
In lieu of developing the personalities of characters in 
''Manhattan Masquerade,'' Burtis, in most instances, utilized 
the device of naming well known motion picture stars ''to 
aid the reader in visualizing the characters'' which he had in 
mind. The story may be summarized as follows : 
Adolph Menjou is an impecunious bon vivant whose cur-
rent economic objective is to marry Spring Byington, "the 
wealthiest widow in America." He is the author of "At 
Twenty-I Have Lived," a risque novel written under the 
pen name of "Nanette." Andy Devine, a gardener formerly 
in Menjou's employ, has stayed with him in the capacity of 
valet while he awaits payment of wages now :five years past 
due. Menjou 's publisher is Horatio Livermore, a hypocritical 
and ruthless businessman who invents artistic excuses to 
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justify the publication of sexy novels. Lionel Stander, !Jiver-
more 's press agent, is a frustrated writer who conceals his 
sensitivity with a sardonic, jeering attitude. 
Despite Menjou 's protests that he does not want to write 
any more of that ''rot,'' Livermore insists upon a sequel 
to Nanette's first book, telling of her girlhood experiences in 
European boarding schools. To secure background material, 
Livermore sends Menjou to Paris. Before his departure, 
Menjou discovers that Prince Mischa Auer of Wetsalia has 
moved into the Byington menage as a permanent, and un-
scrupulous, house guest. 
In Paris, Menjou meets Gabrielle Roulet, a teacher of English 
in a finishing school. Although at heart a mischievous, if naive, 
flirt, at school she wears horn-rimmed spectacles and draws her 
hair ''severely around her face.'' At home, with her hair 
down, she is charming. Her housekeeper is Vera Gordon, a 
Russian with an earthy sense of humor who delights in stuffing 
guests with her cooking. In between bouts of indigestion in-
duced by Vera's culinary efforts, Menjou subtly secures from 
Gabrielle the information which he desires without disclosing 
his purposes. 
Menjou returns to New York and, shortly thereafter, "At 
Eighteeen-I Had Also Lived" is published. It becomes an 
immediate best-seller, Nanette's identity being a question 
of public interest. The press clamors for information and 
~Walter Winchell serves an ultimatum upon Livermore that 
he will discover Nanette if her identity is not revealed ex-
clusively to him. Menjou, Livermore and Stander are des-
perate. Disclosure of Menjou as Nanette, it is feared, will 
ruin his plans to marry Mrs. Byington and also destroy the 
market for the books. They decide to bring Gabrielle to 
New York to act the role of Nanette. 
Despite the instrnctions of Rene Petain, l1ivermore 's exu-
berant Parisian agent, that she is not to leave her eabin during 
the trip, Gabrielle ventures forth and is seen by John Castle, 
young career diplomat. Castle manages to become acquainted 
with her by impersonating the steward serving her cabin. 
In a comedy sequence, Vera and Gabrielle discover his pre-
tense. However, they keep their mission secret. 
By the time Gabrielle reaches New York, the puhlicity 
eoncerning the mysterious Nanette has reached a crescendo. 
Stander has caused a Boston bookseller to be arrested for 
selling one of the books. When Gabrielle arrives, she and 
Vera are secretly installed in a swank apartment and coached 
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as to their roles. Suitable wardrobes and beauty treatments 
are provided. In a coup designed for the dual purpose of 
providing authenticity to the act and ridding himself of com-
petition, Menjou employs Prince Mischa to pretend to have 
been one of Nanette's European lovers. 
For the first time, Gabrielle reads the books which she is 
to pretend to have written. She is shocked and angered, but 
Vera, reveling in the story, persuades her to continue with 
the deception. Prince Mischa already has undertaken his role 
with vigor, running up fantastic bills to outfit himself and 
a growing host of fellow princes and blackmailing Menjou 
into meeting the overhead. 
Once during her tutelage for the role she is to play, 
Gabrielle has slipped away from Andy Devine, now function-
ing as her bodyguard, to see young Castle, with whom she 
is in love. She still has not disclosed her dual identity to 
him. 
As Nanette, Gabrielle is introduced to the press and society 
with a lavish, ali-day program. She captivates the reporters, 
while Vera stuffs them with her cooking. Society is pleased, 
albeit somewhat shocked, by this vivacious siren with the naive 
manner. Alexander W oollcott is completely captivated by 
her frankness. 
Disaster overtakes Gabrielle at a dinner party given by Mrs. 
Byington. There she is introduced to Castle's aristocratic 
parents and prospective fiancee as the notorious Nanette. 
Silently, she pleads with her eyes for Castle to understand her 
plight. He reacts with scorn and contempt. 
Thereafter, the mad social whirl continues in an ever-
mounting frenzy of publicity. Stander, realizing Gabrielle 
loves Castle, hides his own love for her and urges even more 
publicity. The Immigration Department begins an investiga-
tion of Nanette's entry into the country. Meanwhile, the 
FBI has taken an interest in her reputed activities as an 
espionage agent and her close association with Prince Mischa, 
a known foreign spy. Pretending a reconciliation, John Castle 
tricks Gabrielle into coming to Washington, where she is 
subjected to interrogation by ,J. Edgar Hoover. Gabrielle 
flees to the French Embassy for sanctuary. 
There the story reaches its climax and conclusion as the 
principals gather and the full truth of the hoax is revealed. 
At Castle's request, Hoover threatens Gabrielle with deporta-
tion unless she marries an American citizen. Castle offers to 
marry Gabrielle, and a happy reconciliation is effected. Mrs. 
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Byington is delighted to discover that Menjou has written 
the books. W oollcott broadcasts the entire story and comments 
that the books have true literary quality. Prince Mischa, sud-
denly discovering himself again unemployed, promptly re-
coups his financial position by offering to marry Vera, who 
will receive 50,000 francs as payment for her part in the 
hoax. All ends happily in the marriages of the three couples. 
On cross-examination, Burtis testified that the idea of a 
book being written under an assumed name was not original 
and that he had done the same thing himself many times 
during his career. The idea of attributing authorship of a 
risque book to a woman when, in fact, it had been written 
by a man was, he said, a reverse twist upon actual occurrences 
in the literary lives of French authoresses Colette and George 
Sand. The climax of the story, possible deportation for moral 
turpitude, Burtis testified, was suggested by the true inci-
dent of Countess Cathcart who was refused admission to this 
country upon similar grounds. 
According to Burtis, certain characters in his story had 
been suggested to him by various previously issued motion 
pictures. As he said: ''All that a professional writer can do 
is take elements of recognizable characters, recognizable to 
anybody, and combine them in a new form, like a new chemical 
combination makes a new material, until boy meets girl be-
comes an original story because of the way that all the common 
elements are combined.'' 
Almost eight years after Burtis had presented his story to 
Universal, it produced and released the motion picture "She 
Wrote The Book." The picture, which is a part of the evi-
dence in the case, has been viewed by the Justices of this court. 
As the picture opens, ''Always Lulu'' has become a best 
seller of such magnitude and questionable repute that it is 
banned in all of the important cities of the world. George 
Dixon, publisher, and Jerry Marlowe, his breezy, confident 
advertising manager, are worried because they know neither 
who, nor where, Miss Lulu Winters, the authoress, is. The 
press is demanding information. Unexpectedly, they receive 
a telephone call from Lulu announcing that she is coming to 
New York to pick up her royalty checks, amounting to more 
than $80,000. At her insistence, they promise no publicity. 
Actually, Lulu is Phyllis Fowler, wife of the Dean of Croy-
den College, a small and financially foundering school in Great 
Falls, Indiana. She has kept her secret for fear of ruining 
her husband and the college. The faculty, ignorant of the situ-
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ation, has banned" Always l1llln" and threatened to expel any 
~;tudents fonnd rf'ading it, of whom there have been a number. 
However, Mn;. Fowler believes that the royalty checks await-
ing her must be secured to benefit the college. 
Professor Jane Featherstone (played by Joan Davis), a 
prissy, mid-Victorian and apparently sexless female, is about 
to leave for New York to deliver a lecture to a scientific con-
vention upon the '' F'eatherstone 'l'heory of Molecular Agglu-
tination." Mrs. F~owler requests Jane to impersonate Lulu 
long enough to pick up the royalty checks while she is in New 
York. Jane is horrified by the revelation of authorship and 
revolts at the suggested impersonation, but finally agrees to 
the proposition for the good of the college. 
On the train to New York, Jane meets Eddie Caldwell, a 
studious young engineer with whom she carries on a learned 
uiscussion concerning the mathematics of bridge construction. 
Upon arrival in New York, she agrees to meet him for dinner 
and Eddie gives her a snapshot of himself. However, neither 
of them learned the other's name. 
Meanwhile, Jerry has arranged a parade with police escort, 
a press reception, and a round of social gatherings for Lulu 
when she arrives. These grandiose arrangements suddenly 
are discarded when Dixon and Jerry get their first agonized 
look at the prim professor, posing as Lulu. While they are 
attempting to decide how to handle this unexpected situation, 
,Jane learns from Dixon's secretary of the elaborate arrange-
ments made for Lulu's reception. In panic, she bolts from 
the building, pursued by Jerry. Jane jumps into a taxicab 
to effect her escape, losing her purse and all means of identi-
fication in the process. Jerry follows with motorcycle patrol-
men, sirens wailing. Hearing the police, the taxi driver slams 
his cab to a stop, throwing Jane to the floor and rendering 
her unconscious. 
When Jane awakens, she is suffering from amnesia. Jerry, 
sincerely believing that she is Lulu, tries to bring back her 
memory by reading ''Always Lulu'' to her. Having no reason 
to believe that she is not Lulu, Jane enters into the spirit of 
her supposed character with relish and soon is making ad-
vances toward Jerry. 
After she has been properly outfitted, Jane is introduced 
to the press as Lulu. During the interview, she announces 
that there will be no sequel to her book. Dixon and Jerry 
determine that, if they are to have another story to publish, 
they must part Lulu from her money with rapidity. For this 
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purpose, they persuade a friendly bartender, Joe (played by 
Mischa Auer), to impersonate Count Boris Pototski, one of 
the many lovers mentioned in ''Always Lulu.'' In the book, 
Boris had been an expert at spending Lulu's money and Joe 
promises to be equally adept at this pastime. Without further 
ado, Joe moves in as Jane's constant, and costliest companion. 
However, Joe's task soon is complicated by Horace Van Cleve, 
a middle-aged tycoon and would-be playboy who begins throw-
ing money at Jane almost faster than the imaginative Joe can 
spend it. ,Jerry decides to end this problem by arousing 
Mrs. Van Cleve's jealousy. 
As Jane's social life becomes more and more hectic, news 
of her role reaches Croyde n College by way of "Vanity" 
magazine, which features a cover picture of Lulu. The shock 
is profound, and the faculty decide to have nothing more to 
do with her. Meanwhile, Jane has met Eddie again at the 
Van Cleve shipyard and asks him to dinner. Her only recol-
lection of him is the picture, all that had remained of her 
possessions after the taxi accident, A companion informs 
Eddie of Imlu 's identity and Eddie, after reading "Always 
Lulu,'' reacts with disgust. 
That evening, the situation reaches a climax with almost 
the entire cast gathered in Jane's suite. Joe, the first to 
arrive, retires diplomatically to the bedroom as Eddie enters, 
kisses Jane violently, and then berates her for her supposed 
deception. Just as Eddie finishes telling Jane how contempt-
ible he thinks she is, Mrs. Van Cleve appears brandishing a 
revolver, of which Eddie has the thoughtfulness to relieve her. 
Van Cleve walks into the melee dangling a diamond necklace 
for Jane, which he quickly transfers to his wife. ,Joe, his 
dignity unruffled, is discovered reclining in the bedroom. 
,Jerry bursts upon the scene and, in attempting to defend Jane 
against Eddie's accusations, receives a punch on the jaw. 
Soon all are gone but Joe, who proposes marriage to ,Jane. 
She aceepts, but unfortunately mentions that she now has no 
money left. ,Joe politely, but hastily, departs, reporting to 
,Jerry that his job is completed. 
But Jerry's task is far from over. If he is to get another 
book for Dixon, he must help Jane recover her memory. 
Because Eddie has ~>aid he met her on a train from Great Falls, 
.Jerry decides to take her there. On the Croyden campus, they 
accidentally walk into a faculty meeting, where Jane is greeted 
with bitter accusations. She does not understand what is hap-
pening, and Jerry explains her illness to the faculty members, 
830 BuRTIS v. UN'rvERSAL PICTURES Co., INc. [ 40 C.2d 
who do not relent. As Jerry and Jane are leaving the campus, 
Jane happens to wander into her former classroom. Absent-
mindedly, she corrects a mathematical error in a problem on 
the blackboard, and suddenly her memory returns. 
Mrs. Fowler confesses to her husband that she is the author 
of "Always Lulu." But the disclosure means little now; 
Croyden College is about to close for lack of funds. Jane 
decides to return to New York to ask Van Cleve to provide 
money for the school. Her first approach as Professor Feather-
stone is a complete flop. But, with Jerry's help, she tries 
again as the flamboyant Lulu. Disrupting a very formal 
party at Van Cleve's estate, she literally blackmails him into 
buying her off by providing money for the school. At the 
height of the confusion, Eddie arrives with important blue-
prints for Van Cleve. In short order, he is fired, slugs Jerry, 
and turns Jane over his knee and spanks her, all without 
allowing anyone an opportunity to explain the situation to him. 
Everything ends happily with Jane back on the Croyden 
campus. Eddie follows her to Great Falls. Van Cleve's money 
staves off immediate disaster. Jerry's release of the full story 
to the newspapers creates a sudden influx of students anxious 
to study literature under Lulu, promising continued pros-
perity for the school. 
The jury found in favor of Burtis. The motion of the 
defendants for a new trial was denied and their appeal is from 
the judgment entered upon the verdict. 
The defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain the implied finding of plagiarism because there are 
no substantial similarities between their production and pro-
tectible portions of Burtis' story. The determination of the 
extent to which a literary work is entitled to protection is, 
they say, a question of law which may be determined by the 
appellate court regardless of any implied finding by the jury. 
They also complain that the trial court erroneously instructed 
the jury upon the elements of plagiarism, protectible prop-
erty, and damages. In addition, it is contended that the award 
of damages is excessive and that counsel for Burtis committed 
prejudicial misconduct. For the purposes of this appeal, it is 
conceded that some similarity exists between the productions 
as to a portion of the basic theme. Another concession is that 
the originality of Burtis' story, and the defendants' access to 
it, have been adequately proved. 
Burtis disputes each of the contentions of the defendants. 
He argues that the questions of originality, protectibility, 
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access, similarity and copying are for the trier of fact, and 
may not be determined as a matter of law. A plot, or theme, 
he says, is protectible. Furthermore, he claims that the evi-
dence shows misappropriation of his major characters, charac-
terizations, motivation, treatment, and a substantial sequence 
of scenes and events. 
The appellate court may determine whether the evidence 
of originality, protectibility, access, similarity and copying is 
sufficient to support the verdict. (Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, 
Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 695, 698-699 [221 P.2d 95]; Stanley v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 653, 662-663 
(221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216]; Universal Pictures Co. v. 
Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 357; cf. Weitzenkorn v. 
Lesser, ante, p. 778 (256 P.2d 947]; Kurlan v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., ante, p. 799 [256 P.2d 962] .) 
If there is sufficient evidence to establish these elements of the 
tort, the verdict of the jury upon the questions of fact raised 
by the evidence will not be disturbed. However, in the final 
analysis, the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. 
The defendants contend that a "theme," "idea," or "sub-
section of a plot'' is not protectible and that the monopoly 
of common law copyright extends only to the treatment and 
manner of expression. However, at the time this cause of 
action arose, section 980 of the Civil Code provided that, ''The 
author of any product of the mind, ... has an exclusive 
ownership therein, and in the representation or expression 
thereof.'' Relying upon this former wording of the statute, 
the court held, in the Golding case, that the ''product of the 
writer's creative mind" (p. 695) is protectible and extended 
protection to his idea, "the basic dramatic core" (p. 697) 
of his play. Thus, under the earlier form of the statute, a 
''theme'' or ''idea'' was protectible, although at common law 
and under the 1947 amendment to the statute protection is 
extended only to "the representation or expression" of a 
composition. ( Cf. W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra.) 
One of the instructions of which the defendants complain 
was given in the language of the statute as it read at the time 
this cause of action arose. As applied to the facts of this 
case, the instruction is not erroneous. 
A careful comparison of Burtis' story and the defendants' 
motion picture shows no similarity between them as to form 
and manner of expression. The motivation, characterizations, 
and sequence of events is essentially different in each. How-
ever, the defendants concede that there is some similarity 
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betwt>en the productions as to a portion of the basie theme. 
This consists of a risque book written under a pseudonym by 
an anthOI" who, for personal reasons, does not wish to be 
identified. The public, naturally, is interested in the author's 
identity. A female schoolteacher is requested to impersonate 
the author, and a succession of events occurs, including the 
inevitable "boy meets girl" routine. The boy is disillusioned 
and disgusted when he is led to believe that the girl has a 
lurid past. All finally ends happily when "girl gets boy." 
These similarities between parts of the basic dramatic core 
of each story are the only similarities discoverable from a 
comparison of the productions. Therefore, the question is 
whether they are sufficient, by themselves, to sustain the im-
plied finding of copying of a substantial portion of Burtis' 
protectible property. 
In holding the ''basic dramatic core'' of a literary produc-
tion protectible in the Golding case, the court looked to the 
entire theme of the story. It said: "Literary property in the 
fruits of a writer's creative endeavor extend to the full scope 
of his inventiveness. This may well include, in the case of 
a stage play or moving picture scenario, the entire plot, the 
unique dialogue, the fundamental emotional appeal or theme 
of the story, or merely certain novel sequences or combinations 
of otherwise hackneyed elements." (Pp. 694-695.) In other 
words, under the statute as it formerly read, the original 
combination of unoriginal ideas into a dramatic theme might 
create a protectible property interest in the combination, 
although the separate ideas were not themselves protectible. 
As stated in the Stanley case, the isolated ideas may not be 
original, ''But when all of these elements are joined to make 
one ideas for a radio program, it is the combination which 
is new and novel." (Pp. 663-664.) 
Here, it is conceded that the combination of ideas is orig-
inal. Therefore, the basic dramatic core of Burtis' story 
was protectible under the former wording of the statute. But 
there is no admission that each of the ideas in the combination 
was original and, in fact, Burtis' testimony shows the opposite. 
He states that the idea of a risque book written under a 
pseudonym by an author who, for personal reasons, does not 
wish to be identified, was not original. Nor is there anything 
original in public interest in the identity of a notorious author. 
What was original, and thus protectible, was the combination 
of these and other ideas into a basic theme for a story. 
Although the court will dissect a literary production to 
determine what portion thereof is protectible (Golding v. 
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R.K.O. Piet,ures, Inc., st~pra, p. 700), it will not examine the 
protectible portion to discover isolated similarities as to each 
segment of the whole. (Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc., supra, p. 662.) Instead, as was held in the 
Golding case, upon the issue of similarity the standard of the 
ordinary observer should be applied and comparison of the 
protectible portions should be made without dissection and 
without expert or elaborate analysis. (Pp. 699-700.) In that 
ease, the basic dramatic core, the psychological situation, in 
each production was similar to the other in its entirety. 
The only similarities which here appear may be found only 
as the result of dissection of the basic dramatic core of each 
story. Given only the elements of each story which are sim-
ilar, and subtracting therefrom those which are admittedly 
unoriginal, there is no basic dramatic core. No framework 
is created by these elements alone which requires only body 
and filling to expand the central situation into a recognizable 
story. There is, in fact, no central situation. From these 
isolated elements, almost any basic dramatic eore could be 
created and virtually any plot developed. 
For the evidence to be sufficient to support a finding of 
similarity, and thus of copying, the two works must present 
a substantial similarity insofar as the plaintiff's property 
in his work is eoncerned. (Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 
supr·a, p. 699; Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 
supra, p. 663 ; cf. W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra.) "In de-
termining whether the similarity which exists between a copy-
righted literary, dramatic or musical work and an alleged 
infringing publication is due to copying, the common knowl-
edge of the average reader, observer, spectator or listener 
is the standard of judgment which must be used." (Stanley 
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra, p. 662.) Here, 
without unnecessarily dissecting the basic dramatic core of 
each work, there is no substantial similarity between them to 
justify the finding of the jury, as the "average, reasonable 
man,'' that there was copying. 
To have anything of value, Burtis had to add to the ideas 
above di~cussed certain vital ingredients which would create 
a dramatic situation. These included a deliberate hoax to 
be perpetrated upon the public by the male author and his 
publisher acting together. A reason for the hoax was essen-
tial, and Burtifl supplied it in the form of economic necessity, 
sale of the book and marriage to a wealthy widow. It was also 
eRsential for his dramatic purpose that the hoax be discovered 
40 C.l!d.--27 
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under spectacular eireumstanees, so the deportation investi-
gation is ineluded. 'l'hese elements, added to the others, 
establish a recognizable framework upon which to build a 
story. 
However, none of the latter elements appear in the de-
fendants' motion picture. No one perpetrates a deliberate hoax 
upon the public; the one attempted is upon the unsuspecting 
publisher. 'fhe essential ingredient is a victim of amnesia 
who honestly believes that she is the author of the lurid novel 
and that it aecurately depicts her past. By this device, the 
motion pieture is made essentially humorous, whereas Burtis' 
story is serious drama with some comedy relief. In the motion 
pieture, the eentral problem is to assist the principal char-
aeter in reeovering her true identity; in Burtis' work it is 
how to hide identity. 'fhus, in the pieture, there is no necessity 
for a speetacular explosion of a myth. Here, again, is a basie 
dramatie core when these elements are added to the others, but 
there is no similarity between it and the framework of Burtis' 
story. 
Burtis also contends that five major characters in both pro-
ductions are substantially the same in characterization, moti-
vation and treatment. The very fact that Burtis failed to 
develop in detail any of the characters in his story weakens 
his contention considerably. Any similarities are only of the 
most general nature. Gabrielle and Jane both are school-
teachers, naive, and possessed of the common trademarks of 
fictionalized female teachers. But Gabrielle is a vivacious and 
mischievous flirt; Jane is so strait-laced that she finds it 
necessary to screen a partially undraped statuette and can 
strike up an acquaintance with a strange man only by dis-
cussing mathematical formulae. John and Eddie both possess 
morally eorrect ideas of eonduet and are dismayed at the 
supposed identities of their respective girl friends. However, 
John is the thoroughly trained, unruffled, gentle-mannered 
socialite sophisticate. Eddie, on the other hand, is a rough-
and-tumble engineer who engages in public brawls and thinks 
nothing of crushing a girl in his arms and then berating 
her lack of morals or of administering a public spanking to 
a woman. Livermore and Dixon are both publishers of a 
notorious book, but the former is a confirmed hypocrite, the 
latter solely a businessman. The press agents are vastly 
different, Stander being a hard-bitten cynic who refuses to 
permit even love to stand in the way of his duty while Jerry 
is a sympathetic soul anxious to assist Jane in every possible 
Apr.l953J BuRTIS v. lJNIVl!:RSAL PIC'l'URES Co., INc. 8:35 
[40 C.2d 823; 256 P.2d 933] 
way. Mischa Auer, of course, remains Mischa Auer, por-
traying· his usual role. Certainly it cannot be said that an 
author may forever prevent an actor from earning his living 
by the simple device of casting him as a character in an 
1mpublished story. 
Although it might be possible that an author could so 
('.at'efnlly delineate a character as to secure a protectible 
property interest in that character, generally it is held that 
a character is not included within the monopoly of copyrig·ht. 
( W ar·ner Bros. P·ictnr·es v. Colwnbia Broadcasting System., 
102 l<'.Snpp. 141, 147; Deteet1:ve Comics v. Bn~ns Publica.-
lions, lll F.2d 432, 434.) Here there has been no such careful 
development of characteri;mtions. Only the barest outlines 
have been drawn, leaving the remainder to the talents of the 
particular actors chosen to fill the roles. "It follows that the 
less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; 
that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too 
indistinctly." (Nichols v. Universal P•1:ct1tres Corp., 45 F.2d 
119, 121, cert. denied 282 U.S. 902 [51 S.Ct. 216, 75 L.Ed. 
795].) 
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider the con-
tentions concerning the propriety of certain instrnctiom:, 
the award of damages, and the conduct of counsel for Burtis. 
In this case, all of the possible evidence bearing upon the 
issue of similarity has been presented to the court in the 
form of the productions themselves. 'fhere being no evidence 
of substantial similarity between the motion picture and pro-
teetible portions of Burtis' production, the implied finding of 
<•opying of B11rtis' property has no support in the record. 
1Jnder these circumstances, this eourt may direct entry of a 
proper jndgment. (Code Civ. Proe., §53; ef. Pollitz v. Wicker-
sham, 150 Cal. 238, 251 [88 P. 911] ; Schroeder v. Schweizer 
L.1'.Y.O., 60 Cal. 467, 471-472 [44 Am.Rep. 611.) 
'I'he judgment is reversed with direction to the sltperior 
<·<nn·t to rnter a judgment for TTniversal Pietnres Companr. 
I ue., \Va nrn Wilson, Osear Hrodne.r and .J o~pp}J Clen:hrm:nn 
aml denying rdief to Thomson Burti,;. 
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
'l'raynor, .T., and Spence, ,T., concurred in the judgment. 
SCHAlJEH, J.-·-1 emwnr in the judgment and in what is 
hereinafter specified as being what I understand Justice 
Edmonds' opinion aetually holds; I further agree that ''A 
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careful comparison of Burtis' story and the defendants' mo-
tion picture shows no similarity . . . as to form and manner of 
expression." I do not agree with what is said in Justice 
Edmonds' opinion in attempting to distinguish this case from 
GoLding v. R.ILO. Pictures, Inc. (1950), 35 Cal.2d 690, 710-
712 [221 P.2d 95]. 
This case, it appears to me, is controlled by exactly the same 
principles which should have controlled in the Golding case. 
The plot (or, as Justice Edmonds denominated it, the "basic 
dramatic core") used by the plaintiff and the defendants in 
this case, is, as was true in the Golding case, in the public 
domain. It is to the credit of both the intelligence and the 
integrity of Mr. Burtis, the plaintiff here, that he testified 
''All that a professional writer can do is take elements of 
recognizable characters, recognizable to anybody, and com-
bine them in a new form, like a new chemical combination 
makes a new material, until boy meets girl becomes an original 
story because of the way that all the common elements are 
combined.'' There being nothing new or novel in the plot it is 
not, as such, protectible. Hence, unless the author's com-
bination, embellishment and treatment of the common ma-
terials of the public domain do in truth create what Burtis 
likens to ''a new material'' made by ''a new chemical com-
bination'' of the old elements, there is, at least generally 
speaking, no protectible product of the mind. 
'l'he basic holding here, essential to the judgment, appears 
to me to be irreconcilably inconsistent with the Golding 
holding. The suggestion is made that the Golding decision 
was based on the "former wording of the statute" ( Civ. 
Code, § 980) · and that because of the subsequent amendment 
of the statute this case can be distinguished from and is not 
eontrolled by the Golding case. ,Justice Edmonds here says 
"Thus, under the earlier form of the statute, a 'theme' or 
'idea' was protectib~e, although at common law and under 
the J 947 amendment to the statute protection is extended only 
to 'the representation or expression' of a composition." But 
in th(~ Golding case the majority said (pp. 694-695 of 35 Cal. 
2d) : "The rights asserted jn this case are not based 'il.pon 
statutory copyright but stem from the so-called common-law 
copyright ... It is ... only the product of the writer's 
creative mind which is protectible . . . The question as to 
whether the claimed original or novel idea has been reduced to 
concrete form is an issue of law . . . Certainly, if the only 
product of the writer's creative mind is not something which 
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the law recognizes as protectible, that is, an idea not reduced 
to concrete form . . . , no right of action for infringement 
of literary property will lie .... " . 
For the reasons indicated above and more fully developed 
in my dissent in the Golding case (pp. 710 et seq. of 35 
Cal.2d) and concurring opinion in Stanley v. Col-umbia Broad-
(~ast-ing System, Inc. (1950), 35 Cal.2d 653, 668 et seq. [221 
P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216], I would hold that a plot as such, 
being in the public domain and neither new nor novel, is not 
protectible and that only the original and (except in special 
circumstances not here pertinent) novel treatment of a plot, 1 
which treatment (as so aptly described in the above set forth 
quotation from Mr. Burtis' testimony) is the creation and 
product of the author, can be protectible. This holding, it 
seems to me, appears upon analysis to be the holding now 
actually made by this court; it is inherent in its judgment. 
I would clearly declare it to be such and expressly overrule 
the Golding case. 
Carter, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion in this case goes one step farther than 
that in Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256 P.2d 947] 
and Kttrlan v. Col-umbia Broadcasting System, ante, p. 799 
[256 P.2d 962]. Here, after a trial by jury, this court 
holds that there was no similarity between the infringed and 
infringing productions. The effect of this opinion is to deprive 
an author of a cause of action for plagiarism in this state. 
In the Kurian and Weitzenkorn cases, the majority states 
that an author may protect his idea, etc., by an express con-
tract. Here, plaintiff did exactly that. "In 1938, Burtis, an 
established professional writer, submitted an untitled story 
synopsis to Universal Pictures, Inc. The synopsis interested 
Universal to the extent that it entered into a written agreement 
with Burtis providing that, for $250, he would write an 
original story of not less than 10,000 words 'suitable for a 
Danielle Darrieux photoplay' to be tentatively entitled 'Man-
hattan Masquerade.' He gave Universal an option, to be 
exercised within two weeks following delivery of the story, 
to purchase it for $3,250. In the event Universal did not 
exercise the option, it was to obtain no right, title or interest 
in the story. 
1! am, of eourse, not here dealing with, or suggesting that there 
eannot be, an original and novel idea, or treatment of an idea, whieh does 
not involve a plot. 
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"BubsPrptently, Bmtis wroiP il :-;tory nf about 20,000 words, 
whi1d1 lte ddiverPd to lTniYPrsal. The company did not exer-
cise itl-5 option but retaiMcl both the untitled synopsis and the 
screen script in its files until this action was filed. A review 
of the synopsis, in mimeographed form, prepared by an 
employee of Universal, was available to all writers and pro-
dm:ers on the lot in several bound volumes of story materials.'' 
The majority points out that ''the originality of Burtis' 
story, and the defendants' access to it, have been adequately 
proved.'' And that ''some similarity exists between the pro-
ductions as to a portion of the basic theme.'' In order to 
prevent recovery by plaintiff, this court determines for itself 
that no similarity exists between the two productions. This 
conclusion is reached despite the fact that the trial judge in 
the first instance, as provided for by section 426 ( 3) of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, first determined on demurrer that 
there was similarity between the two, as it did on defendants' 
motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case, 
as did a jury, as did the trial court again on a motion for a 
new trial, and as did three members of the District Court of 
Appeal ((Cal. App.) 237 P.2d 41) in affirming the judgment. 
In W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, it is said that "The ques-
tion of protectibility need not be considered in determining· 
the sufficiency of the allegations of the first count of the com-
plaint, based on an express contract" and that "An idea, 
if valuable, may be the subject of contract. While the idea 
disclosed may be common or even open to public knowledge, 
yet such disclosure if protected by contract, is sufficient con-
sideration for the promise to pay (citations).' '' Here, it is 
said that '' 'fhe only similarities which here appear may be 
found only as the result of dissection of the basic dramatic core 
of each story. Given only the elements of each story which 
are similar, and snbtracting therefrom those which are ad-
m-ittedly unoriginal, there is no basic dramatic core. No frame-
work is created by these elements alone which requires only 
body and filling to expand the central situation into a recog-
nizable story. There is, in fact, no central situation. From 
these isolated elements, almost any basic dramatic core could 
be created and virtually any plot developed.'' So far as an 
t>xpress contract is concerned, there is no need for all portions 
of the production to be original (see W eitzenkm·n v. Lesser, 
supra) . Therefore, it is not necessary to ''subtract'' the 
admittedly unoriginal elements from Burtis' story in com-
paring the two for the purpose of determining similarity. 
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Further, there is a basic core, or central theme, to Burtis' 
story. He has an author of a risque book who wishes to remain 
anonymous. The sex of the author is different in the motion 
picture but the book is also a risque one. There is a hoax 
perpetrated on the public. In each case the hoax is developed 
differently but nevertheless perpetrated for the same reason-
that the real author wishes to remain anonymous. In both 
eases, a schoolteacher is the person chosen to impersonate the 
author. In both cases, there is a "phony" member of the 
nobility to add a comedy touch, although the theme is devel-
oped differently in the two. In both cases there is an upright 
and moral young man who is horrified to find that his girl has 
written such "trash." Again, the two love stories are devel-
oped differently. In both productions there is a pecuniary 
necessity for money, and here, too, the idea is developed differ-
ently in the two. 
This statement is found in the majority opinion : ''Although 
the court will dissect a literary production to determine what 
portion thereof is protectible (Golding v. R .K. 0. Pictures, 
Inc., supra, p. 700, it will not dissect the protectible portion 
to discover isolated similarities as to each segment of the 
whole." It is admitted that the so-called protectible portion 
here is the basic dramatic core of Burtis' story (held so 
because of the former wording of Civ. Code § 980). In "dis-
secting'' it is apparent to the average observer (as has been 
proved by the judicial background in this case) that the 
central theme, as set forth above, is similar to that found in 
defendant's motion picture. "\Vhether or not that central 
theme is original in its entirety is, under the pleading and 
proof in this case, not important because here, there was an 
express contract and agreement by defendants to pay for 
plaintiff's story if they used it. The contract provided that 
plaintiff was to write a "complete original story" for which 
defendants would pay if it was used by them. While the ideas 
are not individually original, it is conceded that "the combina-
tion of ideas is original.'' A plot is defined as a number of 
incidents which together form the action of a play or novel 
(Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice, 3, 703); "A plot 
is a connected series of motivated events or situations, forming 
the pattern, O'utline or skeleton of the story action. It is a 
statement of the problems or obstacles that confront certain 
eharacters, their reactions to those problems or obstacles and 
the result" (Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Prop-
erty, § 171, p. 366; Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 
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F.2d 533; Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126; 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119; Harold Lloyd 
Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1). (Emphasis added.) 
It is true that there are differences in the minor characters 
and the development of each one, but as Mr. Justice Edmonds 
said in Gold~:ng v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 699 
[ 221 P .2d 95], "The basic factors of the play and the moving 
picture show strong similarity in their respective plots al-
though superficially there is considerable difference. But 
S'Uch differences go to the quality of the plagiarism, and not 
to its existence or nonexistence." (Emphasis added.) 
The majority, after admitting that the verdict of the jury 
upon questions of fact will not be disturbed if there is evidence 
to support it, states that "in the final analysis, the sufficiency 
of the evidence is a question of law." It is a question of law, 
but to no greater extent in plagiarism cases than in any other 
type of case where there has been a jury verdict. When a 
verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the 
appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to 
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or 
uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by 
the jury, and when two or more inferences can be reasonably 
deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power 
to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court (Craw-
ford v. Southern Pac. Co., 3 Cal.2d 427 [ 45 P.2d 183] ; Juchert 
v. Cal1:fomia Water Service Co., 16 Cal.2d 500 [106 P.2d 886] ; 
Richter v. Walker, 36 Cal.2d 634 [226 P.2d 593] ; Alexander 
v. Angel, 37 Cal.2d 856 [236 P.2d 561]). Here, contrary to 
the well settled rule, this court has made a determination, de 
novo, on the question of similarity which had been, prior to 
this decision, determined favorably to plaintiff three times by 
the trial court, once by the jury, and once by the District Court 
of Appeal. 
There has always been deeided and strong opposition toward 
any ehange in the jury system. It is argued that to have all 
issues tried by the court, sitting without a jury, would add 
greatly to the labors of the court, tend to cause inaccuracy 
in and hostile criticism of its decisions of fact, and would 
expose the judiciary to attempts at bribery or charges of cor-
ruption which would lower its standing in popular estimation. 
In Yeaman, Study of Government (chapter XIII, 177, 178), 
it is said that ''when men talk gravely of substituting the 
learning and experience of the court for the good sense, prac-
tical experience and unbiased instincts of an impartial jury, 
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violence to , and injustice to the cause of 
and And while I would not let a jury 
trench a hair's breadth upon the province of the court, I have 
no hesitation in that, for trying and settling disputed 
of fact, through tho instrumentality of human testi-
mony, where men and their motives are to be weighed and 
and balances are to be struck between conflicting 
witnesses, I had rather trust to the verdict of twelve fair-
minded men of average shrewdness and intelligence in a jury-
box, than the judgment of any one man trained to the habits 
of judicial investigation and aecustomed to measure his con-
clusions by the scale and standard of the law. I had rather 
trust to the honest instincts of a juror, than the learning of a 
judge. Nor do I believe that ... there are more instances 
of mistaken verdicts than of mistaken rulings of law. The 
most we can expect from either jurors or judge, is an approxi-
mation to accuracy in the respective spheres in which they 
act.'' 
Whatever the origin of the jury system may have been 
(whether derived from Scandinavian or Roman sources) it is 
well established that it was not until the reign of Edward III, 
about 13i52, that trial by jury, such as we now understand it, 
came into existence. From then on, however, there has per-
sisted a strong popular conviction among English-speaking 
peoples, that no person should be deprived of his life, liberty 
or property except by the concurrent judgment of 12 of 
his peers. As early as 1215, there was incorporated into the 
Magna Charta a provision which guaranteed the people this 
right: "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, nor be 
disseised of his freehold or liberties . . . nor shall we pass 
upon him or condemn him, but by the lawful judgment of his 
peers.'' 
During the Middle Ages, the jurymen were chosen because 
of their knowledge of the facts and performed the duties of 
the present day jury as well as those of witnesses; early in 
the 15th century in England, the system changed so that the 
jury made its decisions founded upon evidence supplied by 
witnesses; and changes in rules of evidence, as well as the 
right to challenge jurymen, together with improved methods 
of impanelling the jury, led to our modern jury system. 
Then, when we consider that our American law and legal 
~nstit11tions had their origin in the judicial system of England, 
as it had been developed over centuries of human experience 
prior to the time of our colonization, it is not surprising that 
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thit< heritage, so 7-ealonsly guarded by the British in bygone 
generations, is looked upon today by American citizens as one 
of the most precious rights secured to our forefathers. And 
whereas a century and a half of development has produced 
great changes in many of our political institutions, the funda-
mental principles of trial by jury have continued the same 
in most essential respects. 
The jury system, constituting as it does, an integral part 
in the administration of justice, is emphatically a political 
institution, for the administration of justice in a democracy, 
such as ours, constitutes the basis of free government. As 
Joseph H. Choate once clearly stated "The jury system as 
it has existed for ages is fixed as an essential part of our 
political institutions, and it is appreciated as the best and 
perhaps the only means of admitting the people to a share, 
and maintaining their wholesome interest in the administra-
tion of justice.'' 
It is therefore of greatest consequence that justice should 
be dispensed, not only with the utmost purity, but in a 
manner calculated to merit the confidence and satisfaction of 
the public. It shmdd stand for the love of "fatir play," and 
abhor-rence of injustice. In fact, the very essence of the jury 
trial is its principle of fairness. The right of being tried, or 
having his civil controversies tried, by his equals-his fellow 
citizens-taken indiscriminately from the mass; who bear him 
neither malice nor favor, but simply decide according to what 
in their conscience they believe to be the truth, should instill 
in every man a confidence that he will be dealt with impar-
tially, and inspire him with the wish to mete out to others 
the same measure of equity he would wish and expect to be 
meted out to himself-each man in judging his neighbor 
realizing that he also may be judged in turn ("Judge not, 
that ye be not judged.'') Jury service places the people 
themselves, or at least a representative group of them, upon 
the seat of judgment; and to this extent actually places the 
direction and control of society in their hands. In fact, the 
"trial by jury," is the only instance of judicial power, which 
the people have reserved unto themselves. 
''And when twelve impartial men, chosen at random from 
the neighborhood of the controversy, aided by the experience 
and authority of a judge, shall have declared under the sanc-
tion of an oath, what is the truth upon disputed facts, 
the verdicts they render, assuming the jury to be representa-
tive of the citizenry of the community, may be deemed to 
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represent the state of public feeling and spirit, and a tolerably 
correct index of the opinion entertained by society, on the 
rights and obligations in issue." ("Twelve Men in a Box," by 
Stanley F. Brewster, Member of the New York and District 
of Columbia Bars.) 
The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides: ''Sec. 1. In suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law." 
(Proposed Sept. 25, 1789; ratified Dec. 15, 1791.) 
Article I, section 7 of the California Constitution provides: 
"The right of trial by jury shall he secured to all, and remain 
inviolate; hut in civil actions three-fourths of the jury may 
render a verdict. . . . '' 
That the jury trial bas always been considered to he one 
of the greatest rights of free men can be seen from the fact 
that the Charter of 1681, granting to William Penn what came 
to he called Pennsylvania, extended full power to make all 
necessary laws (subject to royal veto) and included a "Bill 
of Rights'' in which was an express provision of the right of 
trial by jury. The "Frame of Government" of the Province 
of Pennsylvania, confirmed by its First Provincial Council 
( 1682) provided that "all trials shall be by 12 men, and as 
near as may be peers or equals of the neighborhood and men 
without just exception.'' 
'rbe case of Plymouth Colony is typical. One of the first 
laws passed after the settlement declared "that all criminal 
facts, and also all manner of trespasses and debts between 
man and man shall be tried by the verdict of twelve honest 
men to be empaneled by authority in the form of a jury 
upon their oath." 
It shonld also be noted that the Declaration of Independ-
rw•.e lists as one of the "repeated injuries and usurpations" 
of tht~ EnglisJ1 King, ''depriving us, in many cases, of the 
beJH'fit of trial by jury." 
A general constitutional provision guaranteeing inviola-
bility of the right of trial by jury forbids any substantial 
infringement of that right. What is this court doing but 
infringing this constitutional right to a trial by jury when, 
as in this ease, it overturns the result reached not only by a 
jnry, hut by the trial court on the motion for a directed ver-
dict and a motion for a new trial? It appears to me that 
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this court is doing indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly 
-that it is abrogating the right of an individual to have his 
case tried by a jury of his peers. It has done essentially the 
same thing in many recent cases and the list is an ever-
growing one. Yet the members of this court, who join in 
the majority opinion, avidly take loyalty oaths although not 
required to do so. All of these oaths contain a solemn vow to 
support the Constitution of the United States and the Con-
stitution of the State of California. Does not the nullification 
of the constitutional provisions here involved violate these 
oaths? 
There can be no doubt that this court, by its decision here, 
has usurped the functions of the trial court, the jury, and the 
District Court of Appeal, and, in the future, such cases may 
as well be brought here in the first instance, since the well 
settled and established rule set forth has been abrogated. 
By its decision here it also puts a premium on theft which 
I had always understood was a crime in this state. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28, 
1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
